US Government Responsibility in the Jeju April

Third Uprising and Grand Massacre*

- Islanders' Perspective** -

□지방정부연구□ 제8권 제2호(2004 여름) : 123∼140

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제주 4·3 항쟁에서의 미국정부의 책임

- 섬사람들의 시각 -

Chang-Hoon Ko(Cheju National University)

이 논문 제주4·3항쟁과 대학살에 대한 미국정부의 책임을 고찰한 논문이다. 우선 제주 4·3 등의 주요사건이 미군정시대에 일어났을 뿐더러 미군정의 잘못된 정책에 비롯되었고, 이로 인한 대학살정책의 주요입안과 작전계획 등이 미군정과 미군에 의해 세워지고 집행되고 평가되었다. 작전 현장에 한국군과 경찰을 투입한 점 이외는 모든 것이 미군정에 의해 이루어졌음의 미군정 보고서 등의 미국문서에 입증되고 있다. 따라서 2003년 한국정부가 이에 대한 보고서를 채택하였고, 대통령이 국가테러에 대한 인권탄압의 결과로 발생한 대학살 희생자에 대하여 공식 사과 한 만큼, 미국정부에 진상에 대한 책임을 공표하고 미국대통령이 사과해야 한다. 이 논문은 이러한 사실을 학술적으로 규명한 논문이다.

* Massacre is used to describe the killings of many innocent victims in the Boston Massacre in 1770. Only six people were killed. In Jeju Island around 20,000 innocent citizens were killed during the six months from October 1948 to March 1949, through five military intensive operations by Korean army military operations in the scheme of program of mass slaughter planned and ordered by USA Army Forces in Korea. I call this series of 5 massacres as a whole Jeju Grand Massacre.

** This work was support by Cheju National University Grant(2001). It was presented article on Harvard Univ. Jeju 4·3 conference from 24th to 26th of April, 2003.

주제어 : 제주4·3항쟁, 대학살, 섬사람의 시각, 책임, 미국정부, 군사통치, 인권, 평화,

Ⅰ. Raising the Problem

When Jeju Islanders heard news that the Special Committee for Truth Finding of Jeju April Third Uprising and Grand Massacre officially accepted the report on October 15th, 2003, they wondered why it took so long for the Korean government to accept this kind of terror/massacre by state power on Jeju Island from March 1947 to September 1954. Naturally, they faced the problem of when the US Government would share the responsibility with the Korean Government about these issues. They knew clearly about the most important uprisings, incidents, and human rights violations under American military rule between 1945-1948. More particularly, the March First Liberation Anniversary Demonstration of 1947, the April Third Uprising, and the Anti Separatist election of spring of 1948 under American military rule. It is natural for them to evoke some questions about the responsibility of US government relating to human rights violations.

US Government Responsibility in the Jeju April Third Uprising and Grand Massacre

□지방정부연구□ 제8권 제2호(2004 여름)

Consequently, this essay has the goal of investigating not only the past context and present meaning of US Government responsibility during the Jeju April Third Uprising and Grand Massacre from 1947-1954, but also of observing islanders' perspective on the responsibilities of the US Government during military rule at that time. In other words, the objective is to examine the various contexts and implications of responsibility of what is the main contents of governance of US Army Military Government in Korea (USMAGIK) on Jeju Island, and how it is handled or treated by Jeju Islanders. Also examined are the roles and advice suggested by the Korean Government and Army in performing the military operations of the grand massacre, but looked at from the angles and eyes of ordinary Jeju Islanders.

Jeju Island actually went through a long history as a province of the central government on the Korean peninsula and has existed as one of the provinces of Korea for the last 895 years. While under these powers, Jeju has been under the thumb and has felt isolation.  When the depth of the prejudice and isolation was at its height, Jeju Island has displayed a strong desire for independence by issuing challenges and protestations against outer forces as a province. Jeju Island can be seen as holding a historic flow that has experienced the pain of despair and defeat simultaneously equal to the strength of the challenges it has issued under recent American military rule (1945-1948).

This essay focuses on one important case study: the Jeju people's resistance against policies of American military rule between 1945-1948, which caused the grand massacre of 1948-1949. This paper analyzes not only why the historical and present flow of events have significance, but also suggests some possible policy agendas from the contemporary standpoint. In dealing with this kind of theme, this study analyzes the provincial citizens' resistance, truth finding activities, and the policy-setting efforts from the provincial point of view. If one were to define the citizens' resistance as a response to the central and imperial government's policy, it would of course be put down as a failure from the citizens' point of view, yet it could be interpreted as a "just struggle" on the part of citizens.

Examining the case studies, there are cases where there are only brief explanations of the results of the case from the central or foreign government's point of view. Therefore, in this writer's judgment, it is essential that a re-interpretation be conducted in order to determine the circumstances that have produced the historical and present flow of events. Moreover, in interpreting the flow of events and their corresponding themes and meanings, the first thing to think about might be the periodic and present significance, but this paper limits its scope to the present point of view. It is possible only when this kind of interpretation exists that we can bridge the past to the present, and thereby, interpret the significance from a modern perspective that leads to future strategies. My method depends on a phenomenological method which can not only find inter subjectivity on particular event or phenomenon among contemporary islanders, but also interpret several common contexts, implications, and meanings of them; sharing with common everyday life experiences and situations of island societies. It is asserted here that the Uprisings, Grand Massacre, and their truth-finding activities will be the foundation to reinterpret them altogether from the islanders' perspective. And upon these kinds activities on truth telling to the Korean government, we can prepare the ground to reveal Jeju's accurate history and develop a policy agenda toward making democracy work towards its destination as Peace Island. This will help give Jeju Islanders an important role in seeding peace around the world both now and in the future. This occurs through genuine activities: overcoming their deep scars, dark memories, and desperations of the dreaded Grand Massacre experience.

) Jeju islanders had good reasons to protest against bad policies and treatment by American military administration during its rule from Aug. 1945 to 1948. That's the common reason they supported and participated in uprising, demonstrations, strikes and rejection of voting. During succeeding grand massacres, they were eager to survive over turmoil and horror of deaths and murders from June 1948 to Sept. 1954. Sometimes they fled to Japan or some cities of main and of Korea or joined the Korean armies. From April 1960 to Jan. 2000, they tried to speak truth to the Korean government about Jeju Uprisings and massacres even though they faced the danger to being jailed or listed as pro-communist because of their activities. From Jan. 2000 to present, they have desired for Jeju Island to play a positive role for prosperity and peace between two Koreas and among island societies through its trauma and tragedies. Jeju Islanders have formed common feelings as a result of their shared experiences.

Ⅱ. Islanders' Perspective on Accountability and Responsibility of USAMGIK in the Processes of the Jeju 4·3 Uprising and Grand Massacre

1. Why some expectations turned into disappointments and protests toward policy of the US Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGI) on Jeju Island (Aug1945- Feb 1947).

Back in 1945, when the country was liberated from Japanese colonialism, 60,000 islanders who had fled to Japan or the mainland, returned to Jeju Island. They returned with aspirations of re-making island society in their sights. Yet Korea was divided into north and south and was quickly dominated by the era of the US Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) in the southern region. According to the Island's only newspaper at that time, Jejusinbo, the islanders had high expectations during the first phase of USAMGIK rule between 1945-1946.  About 280,000 locals including the 60,000 who returned to their Jeju hometowns, tried to find political, educational, and cultural alternatives on Jeju. In one effort, they systematized the building of the Autonomous People's Council. In Jeju province, the People's Council was more effectively organized and efforts to connect the Councils and the pubic were made, which made it possible to display nascent political power. Along with the Councils, Jeju built 27 new schools in an educational campaign effort in every village.  In this effort, the island spread ideologies and culture through intensive education and also further strengthened the tie between teachers, students, and the public. The structure of "public will" granted by the USAMGIK contributed to policy making. However, because of the USAMGIK's response to problems concerning public policy, such as the practice of employing pro-Japanese police officers, rice collecting, and smuggling, such hopes eventually turned into disappointments (Changhoon Ko, 1989).

These disappointments transformed into confrontation with the authorities. On March 1, 1947, a meeting commemorating the 28th anniversary of National Liberation Day was led by Min Jeon (National Front for Korean Democracy). More than 30,000 residents stormed into an elementary school. This soon developed into the largest-scale peace movement in Jeju Province. The American military administration opened fire on people who were watching the movement. Six people (including women and children) were killed, and six were wounded. In response to this USAMGIK action, general strikes in both governmental and non-governmental levels erupted. Governor Park Kyoung-hun handed in his resignation in an attempt to show his protest against the incident and the imbalanced attitudes of US Military Rule toward islanders. However, the subsequent investigation into this incident ended with simply a report from the USAMGIK. What's worse, the media only covered this event locally. The American military administration placed 328 "instigators"of the strikes and demonstrations on trial for violation of four clauses of the USAMGIK Article II. At this time, the USAMGIK strategically made use of these incidents by classifying Jeju Island, as a "Red Island" and 70% of the locals were either branded "Reds" or "friendly to Reds." According to its evaluation report on Cheju-do March strike of 1947, it said that " the population of CHEJU DO is estimated to be 70% Left Wing in political sympathy." (HQ USAFIK: 1947.3.19#482). "Various reports of Leftists state that they compromise from 60 to 80 percent of the population (HQ USAFIK: 1947.3.26 #489)." In contrast to the apparent intent of the American military strategy, in one trial, one of the accused, Lee Kyung-chun defended himself with the following statement:

) General Headquarters Far East Command, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Intelligence Summary (1947.4.10). It said "...on Cheju Island where it is claimed the Left has the support of 60-70% of the population, numbering about 300,000," in the " Resume of the Military Situation".

"I think I am totally innocent. I mean, it is essential that freedom of association, demonstrations, and strikes should be guaranteed in building a democratic country.  In this commemorating event of March 1st, I did not have any intention of instigating the public and have a good reason to take part in this movement as a Korean person. Therefore, I don't believe I am guilty."(Changhoon Ko, 1994) In addition to the trials, the USAMGIK was taking direct measures in the name of "hunting for Reds", which, in effect cracked down on islanders by bringing large numbers of police supporters and ultra-rightist (Seo-buk) youth corps from the mainland to Jeju.

As for these kinds of processes and recognitions of USAMGIK, most islanders had shared a strong doubt about its policy toward Jeju Islanders, especially on unequal treatments within its intentional and illegal framework of Red Island. They asked why USAMGIK disregarded some positive and correct demands of Jeju Islanders and it supported wrong behavior or structure of policy. In a word, they thought these kinds of policy implementations weren't simply an individual officer's mistake, but some kind of policy agenda upon a whole system of recognitions. This is the first point that Islanders want USAMGIK to explain and reveal to islanders why and by whom it was created. Because most Jeju Islanders thought that it is an original point that caused the 1948 Uprisings and the Grand Massacre between 1948-1949, as well as the 55-year long mass hysteria of the Red Complex syndrome.

2. Uprisings with limited arms struggle as protests against the US Army Military Government Unification Policy in Korea (USAMGI) on Jeju Island (April-May 1948)

Under these circumstances, the opinion grew among islanders that the solution to the situation was not a peace movement, but an armed struggle. Local residents began preparing by turning the mountain recesses into strongholds and shelters for their survival.

On February 7, 1948, a struggle began. It drew impetus from the sentiments against separate governments for the north and south and they soon spread throughout the country. Meanwhile, without any national attention Jeju began to gear up for an armed struggle.  Starting with the setting of signal fires on top of 89 o-rums (parasite volcanoes), a force of about 1,500 guerrillas put the April 3rd Uprising in force, storming into 10 out of 20 police branches, official residences and houses of rightists.  On this day, 6 rightists were killed and 19 were injured.

This people armed force announced a statement of appeal to the USAMGIK. The statement had three primary goals: The first goal, on a local level, was for the survival of the citizens. The second, which had a national dimension, was to establish a unified government as opposed to the USAMGIK-imposed separatist elections and governments. The third, on an international level, was for a national struggle for liberation from imperialism. These demands and declarations led to what is called the "April 3rd uprising".

The Islanders' armed struggle was successful to the extent that it surprised the USAMGIK and pro-separatist government forces and it seemed that reaching the agreement of peace talks between the USAMGIK and the Jeju armed forces brought a peaceful atmosphere to the island on April 28, 1948. But, manipulated by the iron fist policies of the USAMGIK, the O-ra incident brought the peace talks to a deadlock and the USAMGIK decided to enforce the May 10th separatist election. People armed forces and locals prepared countermeasures.

The coming election on May 10, 1948 drove Jeju Island into conflict.

"On a rainy day, the guerrillas raided separate election campaign offices. The anti-election campaign paralyzed 2 out of 3 electoral districts due to the locals' refusal to vote by concealing themselves in mountains around villages. This refusal to vote resulted in a partial failure of the strategy of "justness damage" contrived by the American military administration and Pro-separate Election Group (Dan-jeon) and produced a political setback for them: the guerrillas and locals managed to attain a partial victory. So to speak, they could justify their struggle for the establishment of a unification government" (Changhoon Ko, 1989).

While the South and the North were under way to establish their own exclusive governments in 1948, the guerrillas were focused on struggles against the South. Consequently, this degenerated the attitude of the Uprising and made locals feel confused about their standpoint.  Under the circumstances that the South Korean government was established in August and the North's in September of that year, conflicts among islanders fell deeper and the threats to their survival increased.

Considering this, Islanders first asked USAMGIK whether these demands for unification of the Korean peninsula were right or not, even though they disagreed with and blamed protesters and people armed forces in using limited some violence and arms for their cause at that time strongly. They knew and accepted that they shared the same opinion as national leader, Kim Gu toward the unification issue of the Korean peninsula.

Secondly, they wanted to know why USAMGIK manipulated the Ora-ri event.  On April 28, 1948, Lt. Col. Kim Ik Ruhl, the commander of the 9th Regiment, secretly met with Kim Dal Sam, the commander of the guerrilla forces under approval of USAMGIK. At this peace talk, they reached an agreement to basically cease fire, which it would come into effect after 3 days devoid of violations of attack from either side. Regretfully, the cease-fire was never reached: an unidentified group of youth gangsters raided and burned 12 homes and murder 2 persons in a small village. This was known as the Ora-ri event. The USAMGIK forced mainstream newspapers to report that it was caused by an attack from the people armed forces side. It also made and provided a propaganda film called "May Day on Cheju-do", which rationalized the breakdown of peace talks due to violations of agreements from people armed forces (within the intentional framework of the US military government's hard line policy). Next it dismissed soft-liner Commander, Kim Ik  Ryul and posted a hard-liner one, Park Jin Kyung. Islanders would see a new policy directed toward them now (Changhoon Ko, 1989).

In 1989, the Jeminilbo (daily newspaper) 4·3 witness-gathering team testified that it was planned, organized, and executed by right-wing gangsters under the auspices of USAMGIK.  As for this, islanders asked USAMIK why it abandoned peace talks between the people armed forces and the military, which definitely brought peace to Cheju Island society.

Lastly, they shouldn't go to election place for voting because of threat or danger of losing his or her life. Of course most of them already fled to caves and already also want to know why USAMIK interpreted Jeju Islanders' boycott of two election districts among three ones against the separatist election different from other regions in South Korea. According to election rule, it is unreasonable that it was nullify that it is below 50% by voting rate. It was misunderstood that as these peculiar phenomena were misinterpreted as support for anti campaign by people armed forces by USAMIGIK, most of islanders didn't recognize that it was used by USAMIGIK as a hard liner maneuver or policy that voting behavior of island people brought grand tragedy to Jeju society unilaterally.

3. Grand Massacre on Jeju Island as Korean Military operations upon advice, support, implementation and evaluation by the US Korean Provisional Military Advisory Group (PMAG). (October 1948-June 1949)

As the people armed forces group campaigned to get stamp from islanders to support foundation of North Korea by force in June and July 1949, and 8 key people armed forces leaders fled to North Korea the first of August 1948. South Korea was started as a Republic on August 15th in the southern part, and North Korea on September 9th in northern region. Jeju Islanders were at a loss because their campaign for a Korean Unification government was meaningless.  They couldn't respond but to flee and fight for self-survival in the mountain area caves.

Furthermore, the YeoSoo Rebellion in the Chulranam-do Province in October 1948 caused the US PMAG and the separatist government to develop the policy of ground subjugation. Led by councils and control from the PMAG, ground suppression and military massacre operations were underway in 5 turns until the local fighting headquarters was disrupted between May 1948-June 1949, and military operations lasted until 1954. These operations were practiced in turns from arrest, to dispersion, to incendiary fire, and to execution in 169 villages.  Weekly periodic reports (G-2) from the US Army Forces in Korea showed that the PMAG participated in completing a mass-slaughter program of against citizens, estimating that the suppression operation featuring "mass carnage" was a great success.  Their statistics showed that around 30,000 were massacred during this period, and Military-Police forces led 80% of the massacres.

Consequently, Jeju villages were burned down and the threat of being killed drove grass-root efforts to the edge. Jeju Island is known for Sam Da - the abundance of the three elements in nature: wind, stone, and draught.  During and after this time Jeju's "Sam-Da " of island society was considered as three sorrowful tragedies: death, massacre, and tears.  Persistent suppression and slaughter programs, establishment and implementation of the national security law, a preliminary arrest and involvement system, the dispatch of islanders to the Korean War, disruption of self-generation and distortion of culture, amnesty and pacification work, harsh survival and routine threats- all of these factors disintegrated Jeju and further buried its history and spirit.  The ideals of the uprising gave way to unprecedented ordeals.  Under these painful circumstances, Islanders fled to Pusan or Japan, or even enlisted in the army for their survival (Changhoon Ko, 1989).

In summary, the large-scale strategies of the Korea-America military meeting in August 1948 cost the lives of more than30 thousand people from October 1948 - June 1949.  The locals call this "the Grand Massacre (Dae Hak Sal)".  Regrettably, the government until only recently had blocked the truth-finding attempts concerning the massacre. The effect of the Jeju 4·3 Uprising in the political arena is that the efforts of the Jeju people towards a self-government was demolished by the powers of the central government as the zero tolerance political period started.

4. Islanders' recognition about the US role and responsibilities during the Grand Massacre (1988-2003).

In 1988 Jeju Islanders first started to recognize and speak about the roles and responsibilities of the US Government during the Grand Massacre of Jeju Islanders. It has been a long hard life for Islanders from 1947 until now: they have experienced a kind of chaos vortex through the Uprising, Massacre, participation in Korean War as soldiers, and even the Red Complex syndrome. They witnessed severe setbacks and disappointments during the processes of truth-finding activities.  For example, in the Second Republic (which had begun according to the 4·19 agreement in 1960) Jeju people and the national council raised this sensitive but critical issue, but the people who did so were imprisoned under the national security law due to the 5·16 military coup d'□tat.  Afterwards, Jeju people could not even bring up the 4·3 topics: its discussion was considered taboo.  Only novelists, poets, and literary people raised the subject, although they faced imprisonment and suppression. Finally in 1987, the Jeju people themselves overcame the absolutely forbidden blockage by the government and raised the truth about the 4·3 issues on a formal basis. In 1987, the student association at Cheju National University raised the 4·3 subjects as part of the election promise, and held the first-ever commemorative ceremony to remember the victims of 4·3 and thereby placed it in the political arena. In 1988, the first 4·3 lectures in Jeju were featured. This movement led to the first Jeju Peoples' Memorial Service in 1989 on a civilian basis, which in turn led to demands for an explanation, so the Jeju 4·3 Institute was opened.

In the meantime, the opposing organizations formed an Anti-Communism Surviving Family Members Association and put a stop to the memorial service with financial help from the government. Operations to discover the truth started when efforts of the Jeju people and the political demands converged.  In 1993, the 4·3 Special Committee was formed within the Jeju Council and investigations began in earnest. Jeju Islanders held the first memorial service in lieu of all civilian operations in 1994 and focused their efforts into uncovering the truth. In 1994, Prime Minister Yi Young-Duk announced that the government had no intentions of investigating 4·3 on a governmental level, but would support authorized associations should they begin an investigation as an indirect solution.  This led to the unevenness within the provincial government and a defeatist complex in the minds of the provincial people.

The explanation of truth after 1987 was not smooth, but compared with the fact that Taiwan's 2·28 was resolved; it takes on a meaning that is far beyond that of the zero-tolerance politics. When citizens experience hardship and difficulties and in turn raise issues, they can reveal the stark cruelty of the zero-tolerance politics, which teaches us the lesson that we can get closer to a solution. Some examples can be given with the following efforts: In 1992, the Jeju 4·3 Institute excavated 11 corpses from Tarangshi cave, which would prove 4·3 as a whole. Citizens made the awareness widely known of the need for the 4·3 truth explanation and with this as a starting point, they were able to establish the special committee. Afterwards, they discussed the enactment of the 4·3 Special Law on a National Assembly basis and submitted a bill. The fact that the citizens converted the 1994 4·3 Jeju Peoples' Memorial Service into an island-wide civilian event, along with the 1994 5·18 Democratic War Commemorating Service can be thought of as the starting point in overcoming the zero tolerance of the government through the citizens' forbearance.

Although they did not reach consensus as to whether the April Third Uprising should be established according to the Philosophy of Tolerance Between Islanders, Jeju Islanders agreed to make a Joint Memorial Service for the survivors and the deceased in 1994. Each of these ceremonies has served to produce a role of peace for Jeju Island that promotes peaceful relations not only among islands but worldwide as well.

In April 1998, islanders assembled a stone pagoda (Bang-sa-tap) in downtown Jeju City at Shin-san Citizens' Park. It was intended as a symbol not only to block evil forces from invading the island, but also to help share the present meaning of the April Third Uprising and Massacre with the world. By remembering it and learning its lessons, we can further tolerate that is directed from the heart.

In January 2000 after long-standing efforts of islanders, the National Congress enacted not only a Special Law for the April Third Uprising, but also proclaimed in a Special Law for Island Development that Jeju Island be a Peace Island, designated to play a peaceful role around the world. In its role as Peace Island, Jeju Island will share peace with the people of the world as they remember the April Third Uprising and Massacre and march toward peace from the heart.

The Jeju 4·3 Uprising takes on a self-acting character of the provincial people against the central government (administered by the American military) and even to this day, it is an historical and present problem that requires a precise explanation of exactly what happened on Jeju Island. Therefore, the Jeju 4·3 Uprising is interpreted as the both the challenge for freedom and the defeat of the provincial people and provincial government against policy of American military rule.

When the American administration started after the liberation, the Peoples' Council of the Commissars was outlawed in December 1945. Even so, the activities of the Committee for New Nation Building, so called Geon-Jun and the Peoples' Council of the Commissars, were very active in Jeju. The autonomous activities held by the Peoples' Council had strong support from the people and it was even at the point of being acknowledged as the legal government and administration. Furthermore, Jeju people set up various educational facilities in village units and contributed to the educational movements (Changhoon Ko, 1989). At that time, not only was the Jeju standard of living far behind that of the national standard, but also the turnover population was only a quarter of that of the whole population (60,000 people out of the whole population of 280,000), which amounted to considerable difficulties. The reduction of the commercial industry and the manufacturing industry was far over the majority level. Even facing such difficulties, Jeju people overcame the oppression of the Japanese people because of their expectations that they can accomplish a truly independent country. This enabled them to endure the difficulties while at the same time participating in Geon-Jun and the Peoples' Council. This in turn gave them a chance to criticize and curb the American administration. Most of them were either people who had participated in the liberation movements during the Japanese occupation, or the turnover young generation who were very dedicated to the activities of the Peoples' Council and education. Therefore, most Jeju people respected them. The following article shows that they were even acknowledged by the American government (Changhoon Ko,1991).

"It is welcoming to know that as far as Jeju is concerned, there had been no unfortunate disturbances like this because you have just recognition about the present situation within this country" (Jeju Shinbo, January 1st 1947).  However, the conflict between the district people and the central government surrounding the 28th 3·1 Ethnic Liberation Movement demonstration of the Independence Commemoration in 1947 becomes acutely severe.  The first confrontation was about the justness of the present controlling politics and administration. The American military administration was moderating between the pro-Japanese powers and the present controlling powers, but there were a lot of after-effects and discontent about this, so Jeju people highlighted the fact that civil organizations should take control. The second confrontation was about the unlawfulness and justness about the 3·1 commemorating demonstration. The Jeju people asserted that it was a just and peaceful meeting, whereas the American administration considered it to be an unauthorized mass meeting and demonstration, and retaliated by blocking with force. The 3·1 Commemorating Meeting where about 30,000 Jeju people took part, developed into a clash between the provincial people and the central government. The American administration killed 6 people and wounded hundreds of people while firing at them during the suppression.

The confrontation between the provincial people and the central government intensifies during the investigation of the casualties and aftermath of the 3·1 commemorating demonstration. The policies of the USAMGIK became even more forceful and civil organizations went to extreme levels of declaring strikes for all kinds of civil operations. The USAMGIK defined such resistance by the Jeju people as a challenge against the American administration itself and further goes on to define their actions as being controlled by communists. During this trial period, which recorded 72 trials, 328 defendants and 158 were sentenced guilty; the USAMGIK applied Decree Two (Unlawful meeting, violating actions against the American government, illegal actions, unauthorized holding of meetings and planning strikes among others) and proceeded as a military court. On the other hand, the people who were sentenced exposed the unjust trials which used wrongful evidence and torture by the police during the investigation, saying that their resistance was a peaceful one and that they were practicing (according to the American administration)their rights based on the freedom to hold meetings, form associations, demonstrate, and strike (Changhoon Ko, 1994).

After this, the USAMGIK became even more forceful and Jeju people started to look to the Nam-Ro Party, which was extending its underground powers.  Political articles slowly disappeared from the newspapers and sports and entertainment news formed the majority of the newspaper coverage. People were fearful to the extent that they did not dare to protest even when the violence of the Korean police or a civilian became general knowledge. The smuggling acts by the police in collaboration with the American administration continued to occur during this oppressive political state of affairs. Death-by-torture incidents by the police, oppression against the West-North Youth Association, and right-wing organizations, were commonplace. The policy of separating the provincial people and the Nam-Ro Party continued as well.

Even in this situation, the outlawed Nam-Ro party held its stronghold against the background of Mt. Halla and the Jeju people, who had been struggling daily against tyranny and ill treatment, finally fled to Mt. Halla. Due to this hard-pressed situation and the necessity for survival, Jeju people formed an alliance with the Nam-Ro people and both came to participate in both the 4·3 Uprising and the 5·10 electing committee. After the 1948 4·3 incident, the American administration's Moderate Party considered the Jeju people's resistance to be extremely significant, so they opened the 4·28 peace negotiations looking for peaceful solutions, and finally agreed upon them. However, the Extremist Party not only manipulated the 5·1 O-ra-ri incidents and annulled the peace summit, but they also banished the Moderate Party and replaced them with members of the Extremist party.  After the 5·10 electing committee, the American administration and the Korean government carried-out a 5-fold grand-scale massacre which caused a loss of about 30,000 people from May 1948  June 1949.

Based upon my research and considerations, I reveal the passion, actions, movements, and politics of Jeju Islanders toward striving for island autonomy and partially freeing themselves from the peninsula. The Jeju 4·3 Uprising was a movement to protect the survival of the district opposing the imposing USAMGIK in a district historical sense.  In an ethnic historical sense, the Korean peninsula was not divided due to outside forces, but rather as a movement of ethnical freedom with goals of a unified government. In a global sense, it was a civil rights movement concerned with peace and individual rights, and a subordinate group who opposed a giant powerful country like the United States.

As for this issues, a book titled "For the Truth and Reparations: Cheju April 3rd of 1948 Massacre Not Forgotten"edited by Hur Sang-Soo, dealt with a bundle of articles and arguments why the US Government should take responsibility with the Korean government on this Grand Massacre. The argument of Lawyer, James West (James West, 2001) is especially noteworthy. He concluded that "…based on the record it seems difficult to deny US complicity in the terrorization and killing of noncombatants." On the same topic, Bruce Cummings (Bruce Cummings 2001) concluded: "If it should come to pass that any Koreans succeed in gaining compensation from the American Government for the events of 1945 to 1953, certainly the people of Cheju should come first."

Furthermore, islanders want the individual American military players who played fundamental roles in various aspects of Jeju Uprising and Grand Massacre to acknowledge the event as much as some important figures did after the Vietnam War. At least they strongly desire the US government to tell the truth about the US government role about the Jeju 4·3 Uprising and Grand Massacre. If so, we can then discern whether the US government indeed has something to apologize to Jeju Islanders for. Noam Chomsky asked that the President of United Sates at least give apology on the major responsibility for this horrible tragedy as same as Korean President's one (Noam Chomsky, 2003).

5. Present Implications and some 4·3 tasks in the processes of truth-finding activities: its sailing toward to Tomorrow's 4·3 (Respect other's life as human) beyond Yesterday' 4·3 (dreaming of utopia) and Today's 4·3 (taking other lives)

This April has a unique meaning to Jeju Islanders: the central special committee accepted its first report on the Jeju 4·3 and Grand Massacre, and the government began constructing the Jeju 4·3 Peace Park in the outskirts of Jeju City.  Jeju Islanders are already stepping into their domestic solution.

Moreover, it is necessary for islanders to examine themselves in terms of "yesterday" when they were subject to the authority burying the essence of the April 3rd history and recover their independent spirit.  In addition to this, it should not be overlooked that in Japan's case, peace will never come without confession of their slaughter of Asian people, unlike the Germany's case, which has placed the root of democracy by making an apology for the Jewish massacre. So, Jeju's April 3rd Uprising should pave the way for peace and democracy in line with the contexts of Kwangjoo's May 18th Uprising, Taiwan`s February 28th Uprising, and Okinawa`s peace movement.  This is why islanders, looking toward a proud ocean civilization, have sung a beautiful song dreaming of E-Yo Island (an imaginary utopian island) without fearing frustration of any invasion and/or suppression from outside influences.

When islanders consider the past, present, and future implications and some tasks of the Jeju 4·3 uprising and Grand Massacre in the processes of truth-seeking activities, we find threefold meaning. If we combine Chinese characters Sa "three" with Korean Sam "life" we can compose three kinds of 4·3 :  Yesterday islanders were dreaming of an ideal society with unification of the Korean peninsula and autonomous community ( 4·3 meaning struggling and dreaming of ideal community: Aug 1945- May 1948). Today islanders have been lamenting and grieving about the throngs of deaths from the Grand Massacre ( 4·3 meaning taking other's lives and destroying community: Oct 1948-2003). Tomorrow islanders are sailing toward another 4·3( Respecting other human life) beyond past challenges, frustrations, and tragedies. In a real world, during this international free zone age, these factors help Jeju Island play a peaceful role for both for island societies and between the two Koreas.

6. Some Evaluations and Tasks of 4·3 Truth Finding Movements

Islanders, scholars, Jeju 4·3 Truth Committee accepted that this first official report was targeting at and saying about violations of human rights by Korean government and forces in Jeju Island between March 1947 to September 1954 upon 1949 international agreement on genocide by UN broadly. Even though it is evaluated by all that first official report on it (Committee for Truth Finding and Restoration of the Honor of Victims from Jeju 4·3  Event, 2003. 533-540) and succeeding Korean President's apology to Jeju Islanders were real achievements by islanders and people over 50 years efforts, most of them regarded it as only first step to speak about real truth about it.

It's time to point out that we should study and tell the truth of it in the next step. In my opinion, we have important character of fever and desire for unified government and unification of Korean peninsula in it. At that time, Jeju Islanders had stated and emphasized it continuously and naturally in March Liberation demonstrations and strikes of 1947, April Uprising of 1948, and Boycott Struggles of separatist government election of 1948. But it said nothing at all. Every Korean citizen had a right to say about its unification of Korean peninsula according to American military rule at that time. This is the big task to study it in a next step.

Secondly as my main points of this article talk about USA responsibility on Jeju Grand  Massacre as same as Korean Government one. But we can't find any statement on them in this official report even though we had so many official documents such as official reports on United States Army Forces and so on. It is clear that it ordered Korean Army, Police, and Youth groups to do military operations in killing and murdering around 30,000 innocent Jeju Islanders in the name of Red Hunting. This is the second task to be illuminated by us. If we do it, we also tell about the truth of responsibility of North Korean government relating to it. with permission or acceptance of Korean Provisional Advisory Group

5) Busan Daily Newspaper research team(2004.7.6) discovered official documents that Korean government ordered to kill left-friendly prisoners in Taegu and Busan concentration camp on July 1, 1950 with permission of Korean Provisional Advisory Group of USA.. It confirmed that there were 700 Jeju Islanders among them.

Thirdly even though it was reported that 14,028 innocent islanders perished between March,1947 and September,1954 on Jeju Island, we didn't have any article about compensation for innocent victims in the Special Laws on Investigating the Facts of the 4·3 Incident and Regaining the Impaired Reputation of Victims. This is big fault that we should resolve in a near future different from other similar cases (reference 2). Compensation issue for victims must be deal with as same as the cases of Kwangju of 1980 and Taiwan of 1947 Uprising. It is vital to compensate for them in line with facilitating the restoration of the honor of the innocent people who died, were lost, or vanished.

It's my real conclusion that, if we can't resolve above three tasks in the next step, we can't restore its honor in real terms. Furthermore we can't cause Jeju Island to be reborn as a center of human rights and peace all over the world without getting the truth about it.

References

Chomsky, Noam. (2003). Special Note: 4·3 and History in Jeju 4·3 Institute(ed.). Jeju. Gak. 8

Cummings, Bruce. (2001). Cheju April Third of 1948 Massacre Not Forgotten.The Question of American Responsibility for the Suppression of the Cheju-do Uprising For the Truth and Reparations in Hur Sang Soo. (ed.). Seoul. BaekSan Publisher Co. 15-33

West, James. Cheju April Third of 1948 Massacre Not Forgotten. Cheju April 3rd Martial Law: Was It Legal? Reparations in Hur Sasang Soo. (ed.). Seoul. BaekSan Publisher Co. 62-67

Ko, Chang-hoon. (1989). The Process and Character of April Third People's Uprising. Hae-Bang- Jeon-Hu-Sa Insik. Seoul .Hangil Co. Vol.4

Ko, Chang-hoon. (1991). Some Social-Economic Interpretations on Jeju People's Uprising. The Jeju Uprising. Seoul: Sil-Cheon Literature Co. Vol.1

Ko, Chang-hoon. (1994). A Study on Conflict between People and Government in the Process of Policy Implementation under the Era of American Military Regime. The Journal of Cheju National University. Vol.38

Committee for Truth Finding and Restoration of the Honor of Victims from Jeju 4·3  Event. (2003). Investigating Report on Truth of Jeju 4·3 Event.

Records of General Headquarters. Far East Command

Records of United States Armed Forces in Korea. USAFIK

Records of United States Army Military Government in Korea. USAFIK

Busan Daily Newspaper

Jemin Daily Newspaper

Jejushinbo Daily Newpaper

Reference 2

Special Laws on Investigating the Facts of the 4·3 Incident And Regaining the Impaired Reputation of Victims (Statute No. 2000, January.12, 2000)

Article 1 (Purpose)

The purpose of these laws is to perform fact-finding, restore the impaired reputation of victims and their families involved in the incident, and thereby, contribute to safeguarding human rights, democratic advancement, and national harmony.

Article 2 (Definition of Terms)

The terms used in this preamble are defined as following:

1. "4·3 Incident" means armed clashes that occurred on Jeju Island and damage upon local residents in the process of quelling the clashes from March 1st, 1947 to September 21st, 1954 as well as the April 3rd Uprising in 1948.

2. "Victim" means one who is qualified as a victim of 4·3 Incident according to Article 3 (2) 1: the deceased, the missing, and people with aftermath disabilities.

3. "The bereaved" means a spouse and lineal descendants of a victim. If there were not any spouse or lineal descendants, sibling of the victim are qualified the bereaved.

Article 3 (Committee for fact finding and regaining the impaired reputation of victims of the 4·3 event)

1. Committee for fact finding and regaining the impaired reputation of victims of the 4·3   incident (hereinafter referred to as committee) under the prime minister is appointed to investigate into the incident, to judge and decide victims and the bereaved, and to deliberate and decide upon issues concerning the restoration of reputation.

2. The committee deliberates and decides upon following issues:

1) Relevant data compilation and analysis for fact finding of Jeju 4·3 incident.

2) Judgment and decision of victims and the bereaved.

3) Regaining the impaired reputation of victims and the bereaved.

4) Drawing up fact-finding reports and building up a hall of historical materials.

5) Constructing memorial cemeteries and a monument.

6) Propositions about the government's manifestation of its position concerning Jeju 4·3 incident.

7) Census registration settled by special laws.

8) Issues presented by the president for uncovering truth and the restoration of reputation.

3. The committee consists of less than 20 members including a chairman, and is chaired by the prime minister. He or she appoints other members (or entrusts the authority) chosen from people with rich education and experience including the local governor of Jeju Island, officials, and the representative of the bereaved in compliance to what the Presidential decree decided upon.

4. Requisite issues concerning the organization and management of the committee as decided by a Presidential Decree.

Article 4 (Working-level subcommittee on finding facts about the 4·3 incident and regaining the impaired reputation of victims)

1. Working-level subcommittee on fact finding of the 4·3 incident and regaining the impaired reputation of victims (hereinafter referred to as subcommittee) under the local governor of Jeju Island has been arranged to put into practice matters resolved by the committee and tackle entrusted works.

2. The working-level subcommittee tackles the following issues:

1) Receiving reports of damage from victims and the bereaved.

2) Investigation into reports of damage.

3) Payments of medical aid and livelihood aid.

4) Other entrusted committee issues.

3. The working-level subcommittee consists of less than 15 members including a chairman. The position is chaired by the local governor of Jeju Island and other members are appointed by the chairman among people with rich learning and experience including officials and the representative of the bereaved (or the chairman can entrust the authority).

4. Requisite matters concerning organization and management of the working-level subcommittee are resolved according to rules.

Article 5 (Ban on disadvantageous treatment, and the like)

1. One can testify freely about the 4·3 incident.

2. Victims and the bereaved shall not be treated unfairly due to the fact they are victims of 4·3 incident or the bereaved.

Article 6 (Relevant data collection and analysis of 4·3 incident)

1. The committee shall finish relevant data collection and analysis of 4·3 incident within 2 years from the day it was formed.

2. The committee or the working-level subcommittee could require a related administrative body or group data while gathering the data of Clause 1. In the case, the body or group shall comply with the demand as long as there is not any other reason.

3. The body or group shall provide necessary services for unearthing and perusing 4·3  related data.

4. The government shall sincerely consult with other governments when the data asked according Clause 2 is reserved abroad.

Article 7 (Drawing up the report on fact finding)

The committee shall complete drawing up the report about the investigation of 4·3 facts within 6 months from the day when the period of Article 6 (1) ends. In the process, a Planning Department for drawing up the fact-finding report could be set up and operated for the objectivity and effectiveness.

Article 8 (A memorial project)

The government could subsidize (within the scope of its budget) expenditures needed in pursuing the following projects which aim to: memorialize victims of the 4·3 incident, mediate the historical meaning, fully apply themselves as the educational means for peace and human rights, and devise a memorial service.

1. Building memorial cemeteries

2. Erecting a memorial tower

3. Establishing a building for historical materials

4. Creating a memorial park

5. Other memorial projects

Article 9 (Payment of medical aid and livelihood aid)

1. The government could provide assistance to the victims who need to go on with medical care as well as and livelihood aid, which are spent on finding medical cures and purchasing the outfit.

2. The rights to receive medical aid and livelihood aid are not only forbidden to be transferred, but shall not be given as a security or seized.

3. Requisite issues concerning the scope of medical aid payments, livelihood aid, payment methods, and calculating of the precise amount of subsidies will be ultimately resolved according to a Presidential Decree.

Article 10 (Establishment of an office to both receive the reports of victims and the bereaved, and to carry out notification procedures)

The committee shall demand embassies and legations abroad to establish offices to accept reports about victims and the bereaved and notify the establishment within 30 days from the day these laws take effect.

Article 11 (Recording on individual family registers)

There are cases where an individual name has been omitted on a family register due to loss of the document during the 4·3 incident, or the contents of the register are inconsistent with reality. In these cases, it is permitted to re-record the name correctly on the family register in compliance with the procedure fixed by Supreme Court ruling. This is possible even though there are stipulations fixed by another statue abiding by the decisions of the committee.

# Addenda

This law shall enter into force 3 months from the day of notification.

고창훈: 1982년부터 제주대학교 행정학과 교수로서 행정철학과 행정사등을 가르치고 있으며, 90년대 초 제주4·3연구소장을 역임했으며 1997년 11월부터 세계섬학회장을 맡아 영문저널 Journal of Island Studies와 영문국제제 잡지 Peace Island 발행인을 겸하고 있다. 주요 논문으로는 □제주4·3민중항쟁의 전개과정과 성격□(1989), □지방정부의 민주화: 제주도사례에서 본 관용성의 맥락과 전략□(1995), □실용적 섬생태주의 패러다임과 실천논리에 관한 연구□(1998) 등이 있다.

<E-mail: mrsom016@hanmail.net/논문접수일: 2004.7.9/심사완료일: 2004.8.15>