Growth of Local Government Discretion and the Impact of Local Environments on Welfare Spending:

An Analysis of Daegu Metropolitan City and Gyeongsangbuk-Do*

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Abstract

In 1991, the South Korean government resumed the self-governing system at the local level, and has transferred authority for designing and implementing policies to local governments little by little. It is generally agreed that this devolution of authority had little impact and has thus resulted in little variation in policy outcomes across local jurisdictions. In the result of government reform strategies in 2004, local governments now have greater control over how much they spend and which policy alternatives, 67 out of 138 spending alternatives that they spend it on. This study examines variation in policy outcomes across local jurisdictions and the degree to which this variation can be explained by the use of local policymaking discretion, shaped by local environments. Specifically, how political factors across local governments in South Korea explain local policy outcomes is explored. Much as in the U.S., local characteristics, especially political factors, influence local policy outcomes through the discretion local governments exercise. Findings are strong political competition for a county headman or mayor increases welfare spending and increase of female share in a local assembly increases welfare spending in local governments. In addition, financial autonomy, GRDP per capita, local tax per capita, welfare spending in a previous year, and proportion of low-income beneficiaries are significant factors affecting welfare spending.

Key Words: Devolution, Political competition, Female Share in a local assembly, Welfare spending

Ⅰ. Introduction

This study explores the effects of political mechanism of local governments on welfare spending due to the transfer of social welfare services from the national government to local governments in South Korea. By identifying the relationship between political factors and welfare spending, this

study will contribute to the literatures on the decision mechanism of welfare spending at the local level academically and provide the implication improving welfare level of local governments. Many researches about welfare spending have been focused on the question that how the adoption of self-governing system at the local level influences welfare spending (Lee and Kim, 1992; Son, 1999; Yu, 1999; Kang, 2001, 2003; Kim2001). This research trend is developed by two controversial arguments on the impact of self-governing system at the local level on welfare spending; some scholars expect that the adoption of self-governing system at local level increases welfare spending whereas others expect that it decreases welfare spending. The former argues that the transfer of authority in welfare policies to local level drives local governments to provide better services that meet with local welfare demand.[1] The latter argues the transfer of authority in welfare policies to the local level drives local governments to spend more money on economic development, and thus decreases welfare spending. There is consensus that the political mechanism of local governments might influence welfare spending although there is difference in policy outcomes depending on whether scholars focus on economic development or not.

Most of researchers, however, have not identified political impacts of local governments on welfare spending so far. Some scholars found that social and economic factors are more influential than political factors (Kang, 2000; Jin, 2006). These findings are somewhat similar to the findings of Dawson and Robinson(1963)'s, and Dye(1979)'s early studies on welfare spending.[2] The reasons that scholars could not find political impact could be explained by two perspectives in Korea.

In a realistic perspective, devolution of authority to local governments had not occurred enough to result in variation in policy outcomes across local jurisdictions that political factors could work. In other words, local governments' heavy dependency on the national government in welfare policies does not allow the discretion (slack) that the political mechanism of local governments could work.

In a methodological perspective, scholars have not applied appropriate measurement for political factors to their studies. Party identification of headmen or mayors, and members of a local assembly, participation rate in a local election, and composition of a local assembly have been considered to test the impact of political factors at the local level on welfare spending despite there is no clear political ideology spectrum compatible with party system in Korea. But, political competition introduced by Key(1956), has not been applied for the analysis.

But there could be possibility that political factors of local governments influence welfare spending because the national government allows discretion that local governments exercise by giving authority in designing and implementing welfare policies to local governments in 2005. In the result of this devolution, local governments may spend more money on welfare beyond given money from the

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1) Welfare services in South Korea were relatively poor compared with those in developed countries.
2) As Dye pointed out, political factors influence welfare spending although economic and social factors overwhelm the impact of political factors and thus result in no statistical significance(Dye, 1979)

national government, depending on the demand of welfare and will of the headman. This mechanism might produce variation in welfare spending across local governments.

This study tries to identify local political factors influencing welfare spending beyond existing studies that focused on adoption of self-governing system, after the transfer of the authority in welfare policies to local governments from the national government in 2005. Social and economic factors which are used in previous studies are also considered to identify more reliable effects of political factors on welfare spending.

Ⅱ. Theoretical Review

Devolution (decentralization) and Logic in Welfare Spending

Devolution implies a transfer of authority in designing and implementing policies from the national government to local governments. This decentralization allows local governments to have more discretionary power in welfare decision making, and local environments like political, social and economic factors in local jurisdictions to influence welfare policy through increased discretionary power of local governments (Cho et al, 2005; Kim and Fording, 2010). As Tiebout(1956) pointed out, local governments in a decentralized government had better design and implement their own policies meet with their jurisdictions' need than local governments in a centralized government. Hence, there could be more variation in policy outcome across local jurisdictions, and this variation can be explained by local environments. There has been two different arguments about the question that how local environments do influence welfare spending; political model, and economic and social model. Political model implies welfare spending is a function of political mechanism whereas economic and social model implies welfare spending is a function of economic and social environments.

Key(1949; 1956) and Lockard(1963) argue political competition between the two parties and voting rate are important political factors influencing policy. But there is contradiction about factors influencing welfare spending. Some scholars emphasize political factors such as party competition, majority party share, and political ideology of majority party are important in deciding welfare budget. Especially, strong party competition catalyzes generous redistributive policies for low-income citizen and then increases welfare spending to obtain support of low-income citizen to win an election. Thus party competition has positive relationship with welfare(Wildavsky, 1974; Wong, 1988). Others emphasize economic factors. Peterson (1981) argues welfare policy executed by local governments is restricted by economic interests. Only local governments achieve economic development and have excessive financial resources pursue welfare policy (Wilensky, 1975). Regardless of which factor is emphasized, government expenditure scale is decided by various

environmental factors surrounding local governments. Fabricant (1952) found that income per capita, urbanization, and population density are significant factors influencing public expenditure. Dawson and Robinson found party competition is closely related to welfare spending in states, but it becomes insignificant when they control income. They conclude income per capita, population density and urbanization determine welfare spending rather than party competition. Dye (1979) also states social and economic factors are more influential than political factors. But Fry and Winters(1970) found political factors have significant and independent relationship with redistributive policies.

Based on previous studies, I assume welfare spending is a function of environmental factors such as political, social, and economic factors surrounding local governments.

Ⅲ. Literature Review

Most domestic studies about the determinants of local government welfare spending applied the analysis model of foreign studies to domestic cases. Studies performed in early 1990's when self-governing system reinitiated, discussed institutional perspective of administration system and the impact of adoption of self-governing system on welfare spending. Empirical studies began in 1995 when the county and city headman began to be elected by his citizen (Lee & Kim, 1992; Kim, 1998, 2001; Son, 1999; Yu, 1999; Kang, 2001, 2003). These studies explored whether adoption of self-governing system increased welfare spending or not. The finding of each of these studies is different and inconclusive. The studies about the effect of political competition on local government expenditure are undertaken by Ji & Kim(2003) and Shin(2007). Both studies found political competition influences social development spending.[3] But those considered social development spending, not welfare spending. Recent studies try to figure out factors influencing welfare spending by considering various political (party identification of a headman and an assemblyman, relationship between a headman and a local assembly, the time of adoption of self-governing system) social (population, population density, the number of low-income welfare beneficiaries, the number of the elderly), and economic (income per capita, financial autonomy of local governments) factors (Jin, 2006; Lee & Kim, 2007; Park & Park, 2007). Although there is a little difference in their findings, they found social and economic factors are more influential than political factors commonly. Doesn't political mechanism of local government influence welfare spending in reality? I think political mechanism of local governments influences welfare spending. In the previous studies, scholars did not use appropriate measures of political factors producing variation in welfare spending across local governments. They considered party identification of a headman of local government, participation

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3) Social development spending includes housing, health, welfare, culture, and manpower development spending.

rate in an election, majority party share in the composition of a local assembly and relationship between a headman and a local assembly. In Korean political system, there is no clear political ideology spectrum like liberalism to conservatism in the U.S. Hence, party identification or majority party share may not be a proper measurement to examine political impact on welfare spending. In this reason, Key's political competition concept is considered as a main explanatory variable in this study. In spite of the reinitiation of self-governing system in 1991, little transfer of authority in designing welfare policy from the national government to local governments, heavy financial dependency on the national government, and low financial autonomy of local governments do not allow the room for the political mechanism of local government to work. But government innovation under the president 'Roh' in 2004 transferred a significant amount of authority in welfare policy to local governments. This devolution gives the room political mechanism works. Empirical study on the impact of local political factors on welfare spending after 2004 government innovation is only Park & Park(2007)'s one. They considered party identification of a headman of local government, and an election year as political factors and found an election year is a significant factor influencing welfare spending.

IV. Hypothesis and Model

Case Selection and Hypotheses

To test the hypotheses, 30 local governments (similar to county or city governments) in Daegu Metropolitan-City[4] and Gyeongsangbuk-Do[5] (similar to state) for 2000 to 2007 in South Korea are considered. I restrict research period from 2000 to 2007 because the national government transferred 67 out of 138 policy authorities in welfare to local governments in 2005 and report mode of government accounting has changed since 2008(Jang, 2013).[6] Research period seems to be out of date due to the change in report mode of government accounting. This could be limitation of the study. This devolution gives a slack that local environments influence welfare spending and produces variation in welfare spending across local governments.

I focus on political competition to test the impact of political factors on welfare spending. As electoral competition between two top vote getters for a mayor or a county headman and assemblyman gets stronger, welfare spending increases because they need to obtain the marginal votes of the

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4) Daegu Metropolitan City is composed of 7 Gus(Urban Districts) and 1 Gun(County).
5) Gyeongsangbuk-Do is composed of 10 Sis(Cities) and 13 Guns(Counties).
6) No previous research has found significant political effects on welfare spending including studies examining welfare spending before 2004.

minority who are usually not considered as a main target to win an election in low levels of electoral competition situation. Under the a two-party system or a multiple-party system, there is a tendency that welfare policies for the minority become generous as electoral competition between two top vote getters gets stronger. Hence, I hypothesize that electoral competition between the two top vote getters in a local government and local government assembly gets stronger, welfare spending increases. I term this potential effect of political factor the "political competition hypothesis".

H1: As electoral competition between the two top vote getters gets stronger for a county headman and an assemblyman, welfare spending increases.

I also test another newly issued political factor, the share of female assemblyperson in the composition of a local assembly because introduction of proportional representation and the quota system for female local assemblyperson in 2006 resulted in the dramatic increase in the number of female assemblyperson in a local assembly. Kim (2004) studied the role of female assemblyperson in the national congress and found that they play a significant role in improving welfare for women, the disabled, children and low income families. Although it is difficult to apply the findings to a local assembly directly because of the difference in the level of governments, the finding could be the clue that I anticipate the growth of female share in a local assembly increases welfare spending in local governments. At the local level, Kim et al(2010) found that female share in the composition of a local assembly has positive relationships with welfare spending for the disabled.

I hypothesize that as the number of female assemblyperson who has a tendency to be generous to welfare, welfare spending increases.[7] I term this potential effect of political factor the "female share hypothesis".

H2: As female share increases in the composition of a local assembly, welfare spending increases.

In addition to major explanatory variables which are political factors, following control variables are applied for the analysis to enhance the reliability of the study. The hypotheses for those are as follows.

H3: As financial autonomy increases in a local government, welfare spending increases.

H4: As economic development spending increases, welfare spending decreases.

H5: As local tax revenue per capita increases, welfare spending increases.

H6: As percentage of elderly population increases, welfare spending increases.

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7) According to personal statements of female assemblymen, many of them have work experiences as a member of welfare committee in local governments and of women's organizations. About half of them has bachelor's degree in social work.

H7: As percentage of disabled people increases, welfare spending increases.

H8: As percentage of low income beneficiary population increases, welfare spending increases.

H9: As GRDP per capita increases, welfare spending increases.

H10: In an election year, welfare spending increases compared with non-election year.

H11: After the devolution in 2005, welfare spending increases.

Data and Model

Hypotheses are analyzed through the following equation and OLS(Ordinary Least Square) and GLS(Generalized Least Square) are applied for the analysis[8]:

$$Y_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta 1 X 1_{i,t} + \beta 2 X 2_{i,t} + \beta 3 X 3_{i,t} + \beta 4 X 4_{i,t} + \beta 5 X 5_{i,t} + \beta 6 X 6_{i,t} + \beta 7 X 7_{i,t} + \beta 8 X 8_{i,t} + \beta 9 X 9_{i,t} + \beta 10 X 10_{i,t} + \beta 11 D 1_{i,t} + \beta 12 D 2_{i,t} + \beta 13 Y_{i,(t-1)} + \varepsilon$$

Y= Welfare spending per capita,

X1=Financial autonomy,

X2=Economic development spending per capita,

X3=Local tax revenue per capita,

X4=Percentage of elderly population,

X5=Percentage of disabled population,

X6=Percentage of low income beneficiary population,

X7=Electoral competition between the two top vote getters for a county headman,

X8= Eelectoral competition between the two top vote getters for a local assembly,

X9=Percentage of female assemblymen in a composition of a local assembly,

X10= GRDP per capita,

D1=Election year,

D2=Devolution,

$Y_{i,(t-1)}$=Welfare spending per capita in the previous year,

i=county or city, t=year

Data for the dependent variable are collected by various ways. Most of those are extracted from the budget document of each county or city. A part of those are collected by petition for the release of information or visiting the county/city governments. Welfare spending per capita is defined as welfare spending in each local government divided by the number of population in each local jurisdiction. Electoral competition between the two top vote getters for a headman of local

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8) OLS and GLS are applied for the analysis and statistical package Stata8 is applied.

governments and for a local assemblyman in each electoral district, female share in each local assembly and election year are considered as political factors.[9] Political competition between the two top vote getters for a headman or a mayor is measured as the value that the proportion of vote obtained by the second highest vote getter is subtracted from the proportion of vote obtained by the first highest vote getter in an election. Thus a lower percentile value indicates smaller gap in vote poll between the two top vote getters and implies stronger competition whereas higher percentile value implies weaker competition. Measurement for political competition between the two top vote getters for an assemblyman in each electoral district is identical to the measurement for political competition for a headman. As stated in the hypothesis 1, I anticipate welfare spending increases as political competition becomes stronger.

Table 1 shows political competition between the two top vote getters for a headman in each local district.

〈Table 1〉 Political competition between the two top vote getters for a headman or a mayor

(Unit: %)

County or City	Competition			County or City	Competition		
	1998	2002	2006		1998	2002	2006
Pohang	8	24.8	43.2	Chungsong	7.7	13.9	2.4
Gyeongju	21.6	27.9	68.6	Youngyang	8.3	16.7	2.6
Kimchun	60.1	19.1	10.5	Youngduck	25.6	22.7	57.1
Andong	12.8	24.3	46.4	Chungdo	100	25.6	23.5
Kumi	100	50.6	73.1	Koryung	100	18.4	5.9
Youngju	7.8	13.6	25.4	Sungju	29.1	21.4	62.4
Youngchun	8.4	56.0	4.1	Chikok	100	16.1	25.5
Sangju	43.3	22.2	7.3	Yechun	11.7	24.6	17.2
Munkyung	100	3.0	23.6	Bonghwa	24	11.7	7.3
Gyeongsan	36.5	52.9	33.8	Uljin	16.6	0.8	16.6
Kunwi	21.4	100	2.5	Ulreong	42.3	16.7	14.8
Eusung	8.8	55.1	7.6	Jung-Gu	42.3	30.4	36.3
Dong-Gu	23.9	57.6	28.4	Su-Gu	46.3	5.5	32.9
Nam-Gu	30.2	58.0	28.6	Buk-Gu	58.2	69.6	31.7
Susung-Gu	62.5	67.1	31.4	Dalsu-Gu	51.2	100	22.7
Dalsung-Gun	3.1	53.7	21.3				

Female share in a composition of each local assembly is defined as the number of female assemblyperson divided by the number of total assemblymen in each local district. I anticipate that

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9) Existing studies considered a percentage of the vote that a headman or mayor obtains, a relationship between a headman (mayor) and a local assembly, and party identification of a headman or mayor as political factors.

welfare spending increases as female share in a local assembly increases. The expansion of proportional representation and the quota system for female local assemblyperson in 2006 increased in the number of female assemblyperson in a local assembly dramatically (Lee, 2007). According to election results in 2006, female assemblyperson is 437 out of total 2,415 assemblymen. This number occupies 17.8% of total assemblymen, and female share in a local assembly rises sharply in 2006 election compared to 1.6% in 1995, 1.6% in 1998, and 2.2% in 2002 election. This dramatic rise of female share in a local assembly could be a new political factor influencing welfare.

〈Table 2〉 Female share in a local assembly

(Unit: person)

Year	Total		Local Election		Proportional Representation	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
2006	2,451	437	2,403	110	48	327
2002	3,408	77	3,408	77	-	-
1998	3,433	56	3,433	56	-	-
1995	4,469	72	4,469	72	-	-

Source: National Election Commission

I anticipate that welfare spending increases as a proportion of female assemblyperson in the composition of a local assembly increases because many of them have an academic degree in social work, have had work experiences in women's organizations and/or in a welfare committee in an assembly. Political factor which is confirmed in the previous studies is an election year. Welfare spending increases in the year when an election is performed because an incumbent headman of a local government is likely to increase welfare spending to obtain the vote of the minority who are welfare beneficiaries. I give 1 to the election year 1998, 2002, and 2006, and 0 to otherwise.

I consider financial autonomy of local governments as financial capacity of local government. Financial autonomy is a standard that we can evaluate the financial capacity of a local government. It is measured as the proportion of local tax revenue and non-tax revenue to general account budget (Lee and Kim, 2007). Generally, welfare spending increases as financial autonomy gets higher because a local government having more financial capacity. I also consider economic development spending per capita to figure out which policy is local governments' priority between economic development and welfare. I anticipate economic development spending per capita has negative relationship with welfare spending per capita because local governments concentrate on economic development have less financial room for welfare.

I consider local tax revenue per capita and GRDP per capita as economic variables. Local tax per capita and GRDP per capita represent economic prosperity. Thus I anticipate welfare spending

increases as local tax per capita and GRDP per capita increase. I also consider proportion of low income welfare beneficiaries, proportion of the elderly, and proportion of the disabled to total population as welfare demand factors. I anticipate that as welfare demand factors increase, welfare spending increases. I consider devolution of authority to local government as financial structure factor. Due to the point that welfare budget which is influenced by itself in the previous year, I give the lagged effect (t-1) to the dependent variable and input it as explanatory variable.

Definition and sources for variables used in the model is identified in table 3.

〈Table 3〉 Definition and sources for variables

Variable	Definition (unit)	Source
Welfare spending per capita	Welfare spending in a city or county / the number of total population (won)	Budget document of each local government
Financial autonomy	(local tax + non-tax receipt) / general account budget (%)	Financial yearbook of local governments
Economic development spending per capita	Economic development spending/the number of total population	Financial yearbook of local governments
Political competition for a headman	**% of vote obtained by top vote getter – % of vote obtained by the second-vote getter**	National election commission
Political competition for an assemblyman	**Mean (% of vote obtained by top vote getter – % of vote obtained by the second vote getter in each election district)**	National election commission
Female share in a local assembly	The number of female assemblymen / total number of assemblymen (%)	Daegu, Gyeongsangbuk-Do election commission
Election year	2004=0, 2005=0, 2006=1, 2007=0	
Proportion of the elderly population	**The number of people who are age 65 and over age 65 / the number of total population (%)**	Statistical yearbook of Daegu, Gyeongsangbuk-Do
Proportion of low income welfare beneficiaries	**The number of low income welfare beneficiaries / the number of total population (%)**	Statistical yearbook of Daegu, Gyeongsangbuk-Do
Proportion of disabled population	The number of disabled/ the number of total population(%)	Statistical yearbook of Daegu, Gyeongsangbuk-Do
Local tax per capita	Local tax / total population (won)	Financial yearbook of local governments
GRDP per capita	GRDP/ total population (thousand won)	Financial yearbook of local governments
Devolution	Before 2005=0, Since 2005=1	
Welfare spending per capita in the previous year	Welfare spending per capita in the previous year	Budget document of each local government

Ⅴ. Results

The coefficient estimates for the equation are presented in table. 4. Adjusted R^2 value is 85.25 in OLS. This value represents explained variance compared to total variance. Fitness of the model and explanatory power is pretty high.

〈Table 4〉 Results of the Analysis

	OLS		GLS
Variables	ß	t	ß
Financial autonomy	-1296.66* (715.67)	-1.81	-1517.83*** (502.06)
Economic development spending per capita	-93.71 (111.37)	-0.84	-142.08 (92.41)
GRDP per capita	0.28* (0.14)	1.95	0.37** (0.14)
Local tax per capita	0.05** (0.02)	2.23	0.04** (0.01)
Political competition for a headman	-332.39** (157.20)	-2.11	-205.38* (124.68)
Political competition for an assemblyman	-352.95 (326.81)	-1.08	-117.17 (194.30)
Female share in a local assembly	4794.08*** (873.66)	5.49	3743.03*** (635.59)
Election year	-16159* (8442)	-1.91	-5387 (4463)
Proportion of the elderly	1695.14 (1572.28)	1.08	793.93 (1390.64)
Proportion of low income welfare beneficiaries	13396.47*** (3259.16)	4.11	8936.02*** (2461.82)
Proportion of the disabled	3511.83 (3245.89)	1.08	974.36 (2308.32)
Devolution	17631.72 (11238.33)	1.57	5187.68 (7404.90)
Welfare spending per capita in a previous year	0.41*** (0.07)	5.84	0.75*** (0.06)
adj-R^2	85.25		
N	209		209

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

I cannot find a critical difference in the significance of coefficients between OLS and GLS, but a difference in the value of those. Consistent with the expectations, welfare spending increases as

political competition between two top vote getters for a headman gets stronger. This finding conforms the 'political competition hypothesis' that as electoral competition between the two top vote getters gets stronger for a county headman, welfare spending increases, and imply that under strong political competition, a headman of local government increases welfare spending to obtain the marginal votes of the minority who are usually not considered as a main target to win an election in low levels of electoral competition situation. I also identify increase of female share is significant factor affecting welfare spending. As female share in a local assembly increases by 1%, welfare spending per capita increases by 4 thousand 7 hundred won (about 4 dollars). This finding conforms female share hypothesis that as a percentage of female assemblywoman increases in the composition of a local assembly, welfare spending increases. Contrary to the results in the previous studies, welfare spending decreases in the election year.[10] As expected, proportion of the elderly and proportion of the disabled have a positive relationship with welfare spending. But those are not significant statistically. Proportion of low income welfare beneficiaries has a positive relationship with welfare spending, and is significant statistically. Local tax per capita and GRDP per capita have a positive relationship with welfare spending, and those are significant statistically. Unexpectedly, financial autonomy has a negative relationship with welfare spending and is significant statistically. As financial autonomy gets higher, welfare spending decreases. This unexpected result is probably caused by the reason that local governments which have higher financial autonomy are more likely to spend on economic development than on welfare as found by a few previous studies. Negative relationship between economic development spending per capita and welfare spending per capita supports the argument. Devolution is positively related to welfare spending as expected. But it is not significant. Welfare spending per capita in the previous year is positively and significantly related to welfare spending per capita. This result identical with Wildavsky's argument that budget explained by incrementalism well.

Ⅵ. Conclusion

Although local governing system has been initiated for a long time in Korea, local governments had been just implementation institutions of the national government rather than autonomous governments which establish their own policies and arrange budget to meet with their own citizens' needs. This dependency is caused largely by non-transfer of authority form the national government

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10) Welfare spending in the most of local governments decreases in 2002 due to economic depression. This factor may result in negative value of coefficient for an election year. When we exclude 2002 election year, the coefficient is changed to positive value and is significant statistically. This result implies the incumbent headman spends more money for welfare to obtain the votes of welfare beneficiaries.

to local governments, and financial dependency on the national government. Previous studies concluded that political factors did not affect welfare spending except for the election year. This conclusion is came out by two factors that scholars had not applied appropriate measurement for political factors to their studies, and devolution of authority to local governments had not occurred to result in enough variation in policy outcomes across local jurisdictions that political factors could work.

But considerable authority in welfare policies has had to be transferred to local governments from the national government since 2005 and this devolution of authority might allow local government to design and arrange their own welfare policies partially and produce variation in policy outcome across local jurisdictions. I examine whether devolution causes variation in welfare spending across local governments, and if so, how it can be explained. Especially, I try to identify the effects of political factors such as political competition, female share in the composition of local assembly and an election year. I find strong political competition increases welfare spending and increase of female share in the composition of a local assembly increases welfare spending. These findings imply will of the headman of local governments and activities of local assembly women might affect welfare spending through the local political mechanism. Thus, this study provides new implications that political factors of local governments influence policy outcome (welfare spending), as well as devolution of the authority to local governments from the national governments allows political mechanism of local governments to work in the decision making process in Korean local public administration system.

But it is hard to generalize the results due to the limit of sample size which only includes 30 local governments in Daegu metropolitan city and Gyeongsangbuk-Do, and the limit of study period from 2000 to 2007. This study can be extended by increasing the number of local governments as research objects and adding recent data from 2008 to 2013.

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김병규(金炳圭): 미국 켄터키대학교(Univ. of Kentucky)에서 정치학박사(공공정책전공)학위를 취득하고 현재 국립안동대학교 조교수로 재직 중이다. 주요관심분야는 지방자치, 복지정책, 지역개발, 계량분석 등이다. 주요논문으로는 "Government Support for SME Innovations in the Regional Industries: The Case of Government Financial Support Program in South Korea"(Forthcoming), "대통령신뢰와 정부신뢰의 영향요인분석"(2013), "SOD and Implementation of TANF in the U.S States"(2010) 등이 있다. (bkkim1@anu.ac.kr)

국문요약

지방정부 재량권의 성장과 환경이 사회복지지출에 미친 영향

김 병 규

　　1991년 정부는 지방자치제를 재개하여 정책을 설계하고 집행할 수 있는 권한을 지방정부로 점차 이양해 오고 있으며 이 분권화는 지방정부간의 정책에서의 차이를 가져올 여지를 제공하고 있다. 2004년의 정부개혁의 결과138개 복지 사업 중 67개를 지방정부로 이양되어 이러한 여지는 확대되었다. 이 연구는 지방정부간의 복지정책의 차이가 있는지, 있다면 어떠한 요인이 이를 설명할 수 있는지를 지방정부의 정치적 특성을 중심으로 검증하였다. 연구결과 단체장의 정치적 경쟁과 지방의회의 구성에 있어 여성의원의 비율이 복지정책에 유의한 요인으로 밝혀졌다. 또한 복지수요변수와 재정자립도, 1인당 지방세, 전년도 복지지출이 유의한 영향력이 있는 것으로 나타났다.

주제어: 분권화, 정치적 경쟁, 여성의원의 비율, 복지지출