What Influences Inter-local Government Cooperation

｢지방정부연구｣ 제16권 제2호(2012 여름) : 227～246

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in Korea?

* First author

** Corresponding author

지방정부간 협력의 실증분석

Kyung-Jin Chae*

Mark Wilding**

Cooperation is increasingly seen as a way for local governments to meet the administrative demands of citizens, to achieve economy of scale, and to improve relations with neighboring governments. This study focuses on factors which affect inter-local government cooperation (ILGC), in order to identify strategies for effective cooperation. In particular, this study analyzes the results of a survey of public servants employed by the five local governments which run the ‘Eastern Region Resource Recovery Facility’, recognized by central government as displaying best practice in ILGC.

While previous research on Korean ILGC has focused on a single item of ILGC, the present study uses level of collaboration, level of interdependency, and level of mutual understanding as items of ILGC. Six independent variables which affect the dependent variable of ILGC are established; policy factors, political factors, economic factors, capability of local governments, participation, and trust. This model is tested using exploratory factor analysis, and reliability analysis, and verified using interrelations analysis of the factors and regression analysis. The results reveal economic factors to have the biggest impact (β=.421), followed by trust (β=.273), while capability of local government (β=.097), and policy factors (β=.080), also have a statistically significant positive impact. On the basis of the results, ways for central and local government to support ILGC are identified.

Key words : inter-local government cooperation, economic factors, trust

주제어 : 지방정부간 협력, 경제적 요인, 신뢰

Ⅰ. Introduction

The era of globalization has been characterized by the development of new modes of transportation and communication which have accelerated the flow of information, and in turn broadened our outlook. This new perspective has been balanced however by an increased focus on the local. In Korea, the development of local autonomy has resulted in the devolution of authority from the central government to local government, which has accelerated the localization of administration. Interestingly, while the restructuring of administrative regions has led to the expansion of local autonomy, local governments have responded to this localization by seeking joint solutions to common problems.

In this sense, developments in Korea share some similarities to international trends of increasing interdependence among public organizations (Kettl, 1996). Cooperation between neighboring municipalities is now seen as a solution to local problems. These developments can be explained in part through the rapid expansion of local autonomy in Korea and the subsequent increase in administrative demands from citizens. Many local governments have found it difficult to adapt to this new increased role, and the lack of human and material resources has proved problematic. The situation has been compounded by the way that resources are unevenly shared out, with facilities such as culture and arts centers have been well funded, while less glamorous, but still essential facilities such as waste disposal sites, funeral parlors, and water processing sites, have in some cases been unable to meet demand due to a lack of investment (Ministry of Public Administration and Security, 2008).

Environmental issues such as water pollution, waste disposal and air pollution are now high on the agenda in local administration. For example, waste disposal has become a serious community issue because of the problem of where to locate facilities, and this can cause conflict and competition between local communities (Baumol & Oates, 1975). Accordingly, area-wide cooperation in administrative management may be beneficial when dealing with these kinds of issues. Yet collaboration in program and policy implementation is far from inevitable, as leaders must overcome problems such as finite time and resources, and bureaucratic insulation (Berry et al, 2008). Accordingly, Berry et al (2008) have called for greater focus on questions of how government leaders overcome obstacles to, and maintain collaboration.

What Influences Inter-local Government Cooperation in Korea?

｢지방정부연구｣ 제16권 제2호(2012 여름)

Area-wide administration refers to the creation of a wider administrative territory, by transcending existing administrative boundaries, in order to resolve designated regional issues with more efficiency and effectiveness (Ahn et al, 2002). In other words, area-wide administration involves a collective effort to deal with shared issues. When it comes to waste disposal, area-wide facilities can be administered through cooperative arrangements between neighboring communities and their local governments. According to the Land Planning and Use Law (s8(2)), the term ‘area-wide facilities’ refers to those facilities which are operated by a combination of Seoul city, the metropolitan cities, or at the level of city wards, or facilities used by those levels of government. The current law stipulates that if the Minister of Environment, mayors, or local community heads decide that waste can be processed on an area-wide basis, then disposal facilities can be installed and run by a single local government or collectively (Waste Management Law s5(1)).

The advantages of this kind of area-wide administration are that it can improve efficiency by achieving economy of scale, and can help balance local autonomy and central control. In particular, the area-wide approach can be the most powerful administrative measure to resolve communal conflicts between local governments (Shim, 2001). In order to achieve area-wide administration, cooperation between local governments is usually required, and this can facilitate the recognition of potential strengths of interested parties, and can be used as an effective way to create a shared vision or resolve conflicts (Gray, 1989).

The purpose of this study is to identify factors which affect inter-local government cooperation (ILGC), in order to clarify which factors need to be strengthened or complemented. In doing so we hope to contribute to helping local governments overcome obstacles to collaboration. Specifically, this study is based upon surveys of public servants employed by five local governments, whose jobs are related to the ‘Eastern Region Resource Recovery Facility’. The facility has waste incineration and electricity generation functions, and opened in Icheon in Gyeonggi province in 2008 with the aim of creating more environmentally friendly and economical waste management for local residents. This is an important case as the facility has been recognized by both the Ministry of Public Administration and Security, and the Ministry of Environment as offering best practice in inter-local government cooperation.

The next section of this study reviews the theoretical background to ILGC. The research design is explained in part three. Part four presents the results of the statistical analysis, and finally part five offers a conclusion.

Ⅱ. Theoretical background

1. The significance of ILGC

1) ILGC as a collaborative process

Collaboration is a complex process which may be pursued through a range of devices including interagency agreements, contracts, and even informal contacts (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003). Viewed from this perspective, collaboration might appear to be nothing new. However there have been many new developments falling under the heading of collaboration in recent years, with commentators pointing to ‘an explosion of new developments in the area of collaborative public management’ (O’Leary et al, 2006: 6).

There has been considerable discussion of the terms 'collaboration' and 'cooperation' due to the fact that they are often used interchangeably (Ansari et al, 2001). In response, there have been efforts by some researchers to differentiate collaboration from similar concepts. In particular, there have been trials to create distinct definitions by comparing cooperation, coordination and collaboration (Intriligator, 1994; Kagan, 1992). A common theme in this research is the greater demands of collaboration. Generally, the difference is seen as one of degree. In cooperation participants do not necessarily share the same goals, and autonomy is maintained, whereas collaboration involves closer working relationships built on shared goals, resources and autonomy. In reality however, cooperation and collaboration have been used interchangeably in actual policies, and there is a general emphasis on collaboration in organizational research (Jamal & Getz, 1995). For consistency we therefore use the term collaboration.

Turning to the concept of ILGC in particular, it can be seen to refer to the pursuit of shared goals, resources and mutual interests through a range of mutual service, compact, and assumption of service agreements, and these initiatives are in many cases ongoing. Relations are developed through interaction and mutual understanding, and may lead to a degree of interdependence. We therefore define ILGC as a collaborative process built upon local governments' voluntary efforts to promote mutual interests and resolve communal issues.

2) Effects of ILGC

Dealing with positives first, organizational interests can be achieved through collaboration, and can be realized in the process of creating social benefits in the public arena (Marrone, 2005). Organizations can attain mutual benefits by exchanging various kinds of resources including knowledge, and can add value to their employees through the new skills learned (Agranoff, 2006; Hardy et al, 2003). Collaboration also allows organizations to lower costs without compromising effectiveness (Bardach, 1998). Indeed, while there may be various positive effects of ILGC, the benefits can be seen most clearly by examining the results (i.e., the extent to which policy or program goals are met), as well as the degree of management efficiency, and synergy (Bardach, 1998; Innes & Booher, 1999). Innes and Booher (1999) discuss how some of the deeper effects of collaboration may not be noticeable at the early stages, such as collective improvement and the minimizing of conflicts between partners.

It is also important to discuss any potential negative effects. Referring to the wider literature on collaboration, Berry et al (2004) comment on the celebratory tone of research that rarely strikes a cautious note. To the extent that they are discussed, the negative effects can generally seen to be related to time and opportunity costs (Agranoff, 2006), as well as resource costs and the requirement to relinquish a degree of authority (Bardach, 1998). A reluctance to relinquish authority may mean that participants attempt to acquire power over other organizations rather than to participate fairly in collaboration (Hardy et al, 2003). This may occur when, in the process of pursuing their own organizational interests, they try to exert power and influence over collaborators. Representing the antithesis to the triumphalism of much of the collaborative literature, Huxham (2003) generally recommends avoiding collaboration due to the problems of collaborative inertia, power disparities, and the difficulties of building trust. On the whole however, the benefits of collaboration are generally regarded to outweigh the disadvantages (Kettl, 2006).

Research on collaboration in the Korean context reports similar benefits, for instance, Kim et al (2008) explain the effects of ILGC using three main categories. First, improved public administrative efficiency, through enabling local government budget cuts and repeat investments. Repetitive investments and budget waste can be averted and finite national resources can be distributed effectively through the installation of shared public facilities. In particular, through mutual production of services, transaction costs in administration can be shrunk, due to dispersed investment. Second, a synergy effect can be created when local governments undertake complementary activities. This can be pursued through shared growth strategies, complementing each others’ weaknesses, and focusing on comparative advantages. Third, by overcoming limitations, the institutional competence of local governments increases. As local governments provide collective services which are not possible by individual local government, project scale and capability increase (Kim et al, 2008).

2. Themes in the ILGC literature

Within the extant research on ILGC, various areas of focus can be identified. This section will discuss five key themes; models of ILGC, inter-governmental relations, conflict resolution, governance, and factors influencing ILGC. First, perhaps unsurprisingly, due to the lack of consensus concerning the terms, there has been considerable debate concerning models of ILGC (Bryson et al, 2006; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; Thomson & Perry, 2006; Weiss, 1987). Rather than being one off cases, collaboration follows a cyclical process, with procedural factors such as trust and administration playing an important role, along with governance structures and institutional requirements (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; Thomson & Perry, 2006; Weiss, 1987). This process has a direct impact on the results of collaboration and plays a critical role in deciding the success of collaborative projects. As many factors influence each other in a complex and continuous way, the identification of the structure of the factors is critical (Weiss, 1987).

A second theme in the ILGC literature is intergovernmental relations (IGR) (Sa, 2002; Wright, 1978). This research explains the major factors of ILGC through the lens of IGR. Accordingly, the interdependence of administrative units is a major focus, and there have been claims that improvements in principles and rules and systems are needed in order to further ILGC. There are some overlaps with the literature on inter-organizational relations. For example, Oliver (1990) referred to the importance of ‘stability’, which can be maintained through establishing structures for relations in order to manage uncertainty. For local governments, it may be the central government which designs the rules under which local governments operate (Agranoff & Ramos Gallarín, 1999).

A third major research theme is conflict resolution. This type of research flourished in the mid-2000s which is a decade after the launch of local autonomy in Korea (Gang et al, 2005). A particular issue which this research has focused on is the resolution of conflicts in the process of deciding where to locate facilities. Toward this end, the research focuses on financial compensation, the participation of local residents and institutional improvements (Crosby & Bryson, 1992). Research concerned with negotiating relations between economic and environmental priorities and increasing understanding of these issues has led to innovation in consensus-building policy initiatives (Healey, 1997). In particular, there is a focus not only on establishing institutional boundaries in which the processes take place, but also on building positive relationships with stakeholders, and generating governance cultures which are conducive to conflict resolution (Amin & Hausner, 1996).

Research on governance, which has rose to prominence in the last decade, represents a fourth major research theme (Jeong, 2009; Cho & Kim, 2009; Ansell & Gash, 2008; Newman et al., 2004). A model based on the Korean context has been developed by Cho & Kim (2009), which drew upon Ansell & Gash’s (2008) research model. This type of empirical research, based on group interests in collaborative governance is on the rise, and pays particular attention to participation, trust, administrative factors and the characteristics of heads of local government. There is also a strong focus on economic issues such as the distribution of costs and benefits, as well as the development of structures to encourage institutional collaboration and institutional complementary schemes.

Finally, empirical research with an explicit focus on factors affecting ILGC is a major research theme (Kim et al, 2009; Han & Kim, 2003; Legler & Reischl, 2003; LeRoux & Carr, 2007; Sears & Lovan, 2006; Thurmaier, 2006; Weiss, 1987). An area which has received particular emphasis among factors supporting ILGC is the benefits of cost-sharing. However, international studies have gone beyond institutional measures as drivers of ILGC to include trust and political support. Recently there have been efforts to empirically prove ILGC factors through statistical analysis of survey results, and many of the ILGC factors presented by Weiss (1987) can be found in Korean case studies. As such, factors such as financial benefits, commitment of local government heads, government capabilities, trust, problem solving, institutional improvement, and economic fairness have all been included in the Korean literature (Kim et al, 2009; Han & Kim, 2003).

Ⅲ. Research design

1. Case selection

It was decided to conduct a survey of employees working in the Eastern Region Resource Recovery Facility because this was the first initiative to involve five municipalities in ILGC in Korea, and no survey had previously been conducted of those who work at the facility. Moreover, there were significant difficulties in the early stages which the governments had to overcome, including conflict with local residents, physical limitations of time and space, negative media comments, and election targeted comments by politicians (Icheon City Resource Management Department, 2008). As these obstacles were overcome and the facility has in time come to be recognized by the government as offering best practice, understanding which factors promoted ILGC may offer a significant contribution to our understanding of ILGC.

The difficulties were such that while the initial project design began in 1995, it took a period of thirteen years before the facility was finally completed in 2008. During this time frame, the national government recommended construction of the facility, legislation was passed at the national level, and Icheon city government sought collaboration with neighboring governments. However other local governments were initially reluctant to participate and there were even inter-local government conflicts about the location of the facility. Following a series of discussions, facility visits and promotional campaigns, the other governments eventually came around to the idea, as did civil society organizations that had originally opposed the plans. Still, residents' opposition continued in the form of regular protests. Finally in 2005, agreement was reached with citizens following government supported trips to advanced facilities by around 800 citizens and an agreement to build facilities, including 'Icheon Symphony Valley', a space to benefit community welfare and engagement. It is therefore clear that as well as being a successful case of ILGC, the facility has faced its fair share of obstacles and hence potentially offers lessons for other cases.

2. Defining and measuring the variables

There is little extant research that discusses the constituent factors of ILGC and their measurement. Moreover the problem of establishing measures is further complicated due to the differing perspectives taken by researchers, a problem which in part stems back to the lack of agreement over the term collaboration. Therefore several studies have used various techniques in combination. This study will draw upon various perspectives in order to establish both the independent variables which impact upon ILGC and the constituent factors of ILGC.

1) Independent variables

(1) Policy factors

Policy factors are important in the sense that they lay a foundation for ILGC and may contain structures for conflict management. Drawing on previous studies, the present study utilizes the following observable variables; regulations to introduce area-wide administration, central government policy support, metropolitan government support system, level of consultative body, financial incentives, and appropriateness of the function sharing system (Kwon et al, 2004; Kim et al, 2008; Kim et al, 2009).

(2) Political factors

The term ‘political factor’s is used to refer to efforts to identify and resolve political issues that drive ILGC. Many ILGC studies view conflict resolution and collaboration as political issues. Observable variables include political use (for elections), political decisions between agency heads, seriousness of regional agendas, extent of involvement of regional political groups, and level of agreements between councils (Woo & Kang, 2006).

(3) Economic factors

Economic factors are concerned with the ways in which financial loss and compensation drive ILGC, as well as the level of government understanding of related economic issues. The work of Emery and Trist (1965) has been influential here, in particular their emphasis on the importance of collaboration to improve organizational stability and reduce uncertainties amid complex situations. Economic factors are similarly concerned with resolving uncertainties which relate to transaction costs. The present study uses the following observable variables for economic factors; fairness of burden sharing, fairness of benefit distribution, and reduction of uncertainties (Kim et al, 2009; Park, 1997; Woo & Kang, 2006; Chen & Thurmaier, 2009).

(4) Capabilities of local government

This factor is concerned with the ability to exert power in relationships with other local governments (Kang et al, 2006), which may be necessary in order to drive collaboration. The observable variables for capabilities of local government include the commitment and leadership of agency heads, ability to mobilize resources, expertise, negotiation skills, and ability to manage conflicts (Kang et al, 2006; Kim et al, 2008; Jeong, 2009; Bryson et al, 2006).

(5) Participation

Participation is an important factor in securing democracy and procedural appropriateness when pursuing ILGC. Observable variables for participation include resident participation, participation of interested parties, participation of opposition groups, release of administrative information, and formation of networks (Gang & Ahn, 2005; Kim et al, 2008; Newman at al, 2004).

(6) Trust

Trust built between local governments acts as a driving force to facilitate collaboration. In other words, collaboration accelerates when collaborative partners share information and knowledge, and build trust by proving their good intentions and abilities (Merrill-Sands & Sheridan, 1996). Observable variables relating to trust include the formation of mutually beneficial relations, efforts to share information, appropriateness of procedures and steps, and free flow of information (Kwon et al, 2004; Hong & Kim, 2002; Merrill-Sands & Sheridan, 1996; Sears & Lovan, 2006).

2) Dependent variable: ILGC

As discussed above, ILGC can be viewed as a collaborative process built upon local governments' voluntary efforts to promote mutual interests and resolve communal issues, and the main characteristics are interdependency and mutual understanding. However, attempts to measure ILGC have limitations, in particular because they have been mainly focused on a single item (Jeong, 2009; Lackey et al., 2002). In contrast to previous studies, the present study has focused on the characteristics of ILGC, drawn up items, and utilized regression analysis, in order to overcome the methodological limitations of the single item approach. Observable variables of ILGC include level of collaboration, level of interdependency, and level of mutual understanding (Gang & Ahn, 2004; Legler & Reischl, 2003; Lackey et al., 2002).

3) Research model

Based on the factors established above, the present study formulated relations of effects and designed the following research model.

<Figure 1> Research Model

Policy factors Political factors Economic factors Capability of local government Participation Trust	⇨	Inter-local government cooperation

3. Data Collection

The survey was analyzed by adding two factors (political and economic factors) to the survey data used in the structural equation model analysis of a previous study by Chae & Chai (2011).

The survey respondents were civil servants working for five local governments in Gyeonggi province, which cooperated to establish the ‘Eastern Region Resource Recovery Facility’; Icheon City, Gwangju City, Hanam City, Yeoju-Gun, and Yangpyeong-Gun. The survey was conducted over a period of 30 days between August 18th and November 16th 2010, through a series of visits to government offices. Out of 1000 distributed questionnaires, 586 copies were returned (response rate 58.6%). Except for one unreliable response, 585 copies were analyzed using SPSS 16.0.

Ⅳ. Results

1. Appropriateness and reliability of measurement tools

In order to identify causal relationships between ILGC factors, analysis was conducted on the appropriateness and reliability of the observable variables. Principle component analysis was used as the factor extraction method, and exploratory factor analysis was conducted using Varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization. The results, displayed in table 1, reveal large values for the KMO measure at 0.936(.000) and that communalities were higher than 0.47 in all items. Results extracted from factors with more than one eigen value were categorized according to seven factors by measuring the observable variables.

Factor one is composed of regulations to introduce area-wide administration (.722), central government policy support (.829), metropolitan government support system (.800), level of consultative body (.706), financial incentives from higher levels of government (.775), and division of functions with other local governments (.706). Factor two consists of local resident participation (.766), interested parties (.799), opposition groups (.697), level of administrative information release (.580), and establishing networks (.578).

<Table 1> Exploratory factor analysis

Variables to examine	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6	Factor 7	communalities
Regulations to introduce area-wide administration	.722	.181	.001	.160	.086	.173	.077	.624
Central government policy support	.829	.147	.104	.153	.079	.047	.079	.758
Metropolitan government support system	.800	.130	.080	.165	.094	.113	.055	.715
Level of consultative body	.706	.104	.243	.166	.111	.188	.020	.644
Financial incentives from higher levels of government	.775	.090	.100	.089	.155	.028	-.007	.651
Division of functions with other local government	.706	.165	.244	.124	.198	.101	-.002	.650
Political use (for elections)	.124	.129	.280	-.048	-.042	.253	.623	.566
Political decisions between agency heads	-.010	.032	.034	.045	.058	-.101	.846	.734
Involvement of regional political groups	.054	.098	-.076	.112	.179	.065	.749	.628
Fairness of burden sharing	.231	.141	.150	.138	.821	.152	.110	.824
Fairness of benefit distribution	.213	.158	.126	.128	.823	.155	.093	.812
Preparation for future uncertainties	.138	.145	.327	.168	.603	.225	.094	.598
Commitment of agency heads	-.037	.084	.192	.603	.066	.146	.194	.472
Capability to mobilize resources	.372	.176	.132	.588	.008	.225	.027	.584
Expertise	.360	.241	.161	.667	.127	.120	-.045	.691
Negotiation skills	.302	.221	.239	.708	.193	.071	-.024	.742
Conflict resolution skills	.258	.254	.227	.643	.219	.081	.026	.652
Local resident participation	.228	.766	.194	.170	.096	.135	-.019	.732
Interested parties	.162	.799	.175	.153	.097	.162	-.005	.755
Opposition groups	.086	.697	.026	.107	.095	-.004	.288	.598
Level of administrative information release	.198	.580	.234	.248	.176	.118	.099	.546
Establishing networks	.219	.578	.344	.246	.126	.237	.032	.634
Form mutually benefiting associations	.144	.215	.660	.227	.252	.300	.060	.712
Efforts to share information	.209	.253	.731	.265	.079	.175	.039	.750
Appropriateness of procedures and steps	.171	.164	.759	.251	.176	.157	.075	.757
Horizontal communication	.233	.265	.589	.235	.253	.221	.056	.643
Level of collaboration	.187	.153	.317	.305	.294	.586	.003	.683
Level of interdependence	.210	.180	.200	.150	.178	.788	.115	.805
Level of mutual understanding	.195	.175	.274	.186	.204	.758	.033	.797
Eigen value	4.447	3.097	2.916	2.854	2.355	2.214	1.875
Contribution rate(%)	15.336	10.678	10.055	9.842	8.119	7.634	6.465
Accumulated contribution(%)	15.336	26.013	36.068	45.911	54.030	61.664	68.129

* 6 times rotated

Factor three is composed of form mutually benefiting associations with trust (.660), efforts to share information (.731), appropriateness of procedure/steps (.759), horizontal communication (.589). Factor four is comprised of commitment of agency heads (.603), capability to mobilize resources (.588), expertise (.667), negotiation skills (.708), and conflict resolution skills (.643). Factor five includes fairness of burden sharing (.821), fairness of benefit distribution (.823), and preparation for future uncertainties (.603). Factor six is composed of level of collaboration (.586), level of interdependence (.788), and level of mutual understanding (.758). Lastly, factor seven consists of political use (for elections) (.623), political decisions between agency heads, (.846), and involvement of regional political groups (.749).

The factors turned out to have explanatory power. The cumulative contribution rate was 68.129%, factor one makes up 15.336%, factor two is 10.678%, factor three is 10.055%, factor 4 is 9.842%, factor 5 is 8.119%, factor 6 is 7.634%, factor 7 is 6.465%.

Table 2, below, presents the results of the reliability analysis, conducted using Cronbach's Alpha(a) by factor. The results show that for all factors, Cronbach's Alpha(a) values are above 0.6, and are therefore highly reliable. The alpha value of the policy factors is .897, political factors is .649, economic factors is .825, capabilities of local government is .823, participation is 0.843, trust is .871, ILGC is .813.

<Table 2> Analysis of trust level

Factor	Number of items	Mean	Standard deviation	Alpha
Policy (scheme) factors	6	2.78	.621	.897
Political factors	3	3.06	.618	.649
Economic factors	3	3.06	.572	.825
Capability of local government	5	3.10	.625	.823
Participation	5	3.08	.624	.843
Trust	4	3.12	.651	.871
ILGC	3	3.08	.606	.813

2. Verification of the Regression Model

To verify the regression model, interrelations analysis was conducted between the seven factors, using Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient (two-tailed test). The analysis in table 3 shows that all independent variables have statistically significant (p<0.01) positive correlation co-efficients in relation to the dependent variable ILGC. On this basis, the regression model can be expected to show positive causal relations.

<Table 3> Analysis of interrelations

Factor	Policy factors	Political factors	Economic factors	Capability of local government	Participation	Trust	ILGC
Policy factors	1.00
Political factors	.175**	1.00
Economic factors	.537**	.318**	1.00
Capability of local government	.580**	.199**	.581**	1.00
Participation	.489**	.274**	.541**	.606**	1.00
Trust	.499**	.249**	.667**	.656**	.620**	1.00
ILGC	.519**	.232**	.723**	.593**	.539**	.683**	1.00

** p<0.01

The next stage in testing the model was to perform a regression analysis for the dependent variable of ILGC. The results, displayed in table 4, reveal the value of R2(adjR2) to have good explanatory power at 0.612(0.608), the Durbin-Watson value was 1.920, while the tolerance limit, and VIF (variance inflation factors) also met the standard acceptance levels. There was no issue of multicollinearity.

The regression analysis also reveals that economic factors (β=.421) and trust (β=.273) were statistically significant to p<0.01 in relation to the independent variable of ILGC. The capabilities of local government (β=.097) and policy factors (β=.080) were statistically significant at p<0.05. On the other hand, political factors (β=-.016) and participation (β=.048) were not statistically significant at p<0.05.

<Table 4> Regression Analysis

Factor	Non standard co-efficient		standard co-efficient	t	sig
	B	Standard error	Beta
(Constant)	.318	.109		2.908	.004
Policy factors	.078	.033	.080	2.371	.018*
Political factors	-.016	.027	-.016	-.588	.557
Economic factors	.446	.040	.421	11.087	.000**
Capability of local government	.094	.038	.097	2.488	.013*
Participation	.047	.035	.048	1.348	.178
Trust	.255	.038	.273	6.774	.000**

**p<0.01, *p<0.05, R2(adjR2)=.612(.608), F=152.249, p=.000

3. Discussion

Among the factors affecting ILGC, the results of the regression analysis reveal economic factors to be the most significant (β=.421). From the perspective of local government employees, securing budgets is essential to achieve project success. In particular, since the launch of local autonomy, many local governments have pursued various projects to meet the growing demands of local residents and to compete against other local governments, which has at times led to financial woe. Against this backdrop, local governments should consider alternative service delivery methods, such as shared service delivery, which represent a possible solution to the mounting fiscal pressure which they face (LeRoux and Carr, 2007). The five local governments involved in the ‘Eastern Region Resource Recovery Facility’ were motivated to collaborate due to financial pressure. In this case, the most important element to facilitate agreement among local governments has been fair burden sharing and benefit distribution. This means that in the process of collaborating, local governments should share burdens and distribute benefits as fairly as possible, and communicate about economic factors in order to reduce future uncertainties.

Following economic explanations, the second most significant factor was trust (β=.273). Building trust was seen as instrumental in forming cooperative relations, and it helped to manage issues such as a lack of shared information and lack of communications. Therefore, local governments are recommended to form mutually benefiting relations with other local governments, make efforts to share information, secure appropriate procedures and steps, and build trust through the free flow of communications. Building trust is often conceived of as a cyclical process (Vangen & Huxham, 2003), and as such it requires participants to take risks. After one party takes a risk, if this is reciprocated, it can help to build trust. As such, local governments should be encouraged to gradually increase the level of risk when working together in order to build trust.

Capabilities of local government (β=.097) and policy factors (β=.080) also turned out to affect ILGC, but had comparatively little influence. Capabilities of local government help to pursue policy goals, and can be expressed through the commitment of agency heads. In order to increase capability to deal with problems, local governments should arrange negotiations, debates and open discussion sessions with other local governments, as well as discussion sessions for residents in order to overcome conflicts. In addition, by ensuring continuity of the officials in charge of cooperative projects, they can provide an environment to nurture expertise.

In the case of policy factors, central and local governments should provide financial incentives, including grants, to encourage the building of area-wide facilities, and provide administrative support. Cooperative projects already receive installation and operating fees from central government. However, more widespread financial support would enable more larger multilateral projects to be established, and therefore develop ILGC. Finance is not the only issue however, and establishing joint local government consultative bodies such as committees would help to delegate roles in each project, and aid discussion of how to divide functions, which would lay a solid foundation for the promotion of collaborative projects.

Participation was perceived to have comparatively less impact on ILGC (β=.048), although this result is not statistically significant. This is interesting because the official literature emphasizes the importance of citizen-oriented administration (Icheon City Resource Management Department, 2008). A potential explanation is that because citizen protests were drawn out over the course of years and significant spending was required to get the public onside, participation may be viewed negatively by employees who work on the project. Alternatively, it could be that participation is seen as less important now that the project is actually operating. It is important that participation is not overlooked however, as if problems arise due to a lack of participation, such as protests, it may become very difficult for organizations to achieve their goals.

Political factors were perceived to have a negative influence (β=-.016), although these results were again not statistically significant. Respondents' views may be at least partly explained by the fact that the national government recommended construction of the facility in order to achieve more efficient waste management, meaning that the need for political deals between councilors was therefore reduced. While it is quite possible that political factors, i.e., political discussions between local and national government may have played a part in national government recommending the ILGC and passing the Waste Management Law, if these did take place they were invisible to those now working in the facility. On the other hand, election targeted comments by politicians were much more visible, but appear to have been seen as counterproductive. The circumstances suggest that the reasons for such low figures for the influence of political factors may be particular to this case, and it is therefore important not to write off the effects of political factors on ILGC, particular as if the political environment is not conducive, then this could lead to great difficulties for ILGC.

Ⅴ. Conclusion

This study is significant as it has identified multiple-item factors which influence IGLC. The factors were used in a survey of local government officials in charge of a five government area-wide facility. This is the first time that a survey of a five government area-wide facility has been conducted. The regression analysis verifies that these factors influence ILGC. In particular, the analysis reveals economic factors (β=.421), trust (β=.273), capabilities of local government (β=.097), and policy factors (β=.080), to all have statistically significant positive impact on ILGC. Accordingly, the key to the success of ILGC lies in fair distribution of costs and benefits and in increasing trust, which means that a multi-pronged approach is necessary. While participation and political factors were judged to have less impact, if problems occur which are related to these factors then this could highlight the necessity of participation and political support. As such it is important that these factors are not overlooked.

Despite these discoveries, there are some limitations to the extent to which it is possible to generalize to other ILGC cases. Moreover, due to the relative lack of empirical studies, the appropriateness of the survey items could possibly be an issue. Still, the results from the analysis of local government officials’ responses may offer some valuable lessons for other local governments seeking ILGC. Future studies should test the survey items developed in this study in other cases of ILGC, in order to develop a more detailed understanding of which factors influence ILGC.

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Kyung-Jin Chae: is a Assistant professor in the Department of Public Administration at Seoul Jeil Graduate University. He has a Ph.D in Public Administration from the Catholic University of Korea. His current research focuses on cultural policy, emotional labor, and inter-local government cooperation.

<E-mail: kjinchae@gmail.com / 논문접수일: 2012. 07. 12/ 심사개시일: 2012. 07. 16 / 심사완료일: 2012. 08. 16>

Mark Wilding: is a Assistant professor in the Department of Public Administration at the Catholic University of Korea. He has a Ph.D in Labor Studies from the University of Manchester, UK. His current research focuses on social enterprise policies, emotional labor, and the mobility of policies across various contexts.

<E-mail: maw@catholic.ac.kr>